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Abstract
On 23 June 2016, voters in the United Kingdom (UK) rejected remaining in the European Union
(EU) and the result initiated processes that can lead to the eventual resolution of the present UK-
EU contractual relations.1 The ‘New Settlement’, approved in February 2016, and the period
since the June referendum may serve us with many ideas regarding the conceptual elements of
future contractual relations. In addition to the statements of Heads of State and Governments,
several approaches can be found at both EU and national level which foreshadow future
directions. Our considerations need to be seen through that prism. Firm political support for
the four freedoms of the Internal Market and emphasis on the guiding principle of ‘everything
can be put on the table once the Article 50 process is triggered’, are regarded as such, as along
with the activity of the European Commission (its proposals in the field of free movement), the
case-law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on social rights and some newly enacted
legislation in the target countries of intra-EU migration. The article is centred around two
questions, namely why the British attempt to restrict free movement of persons is not an isolated
phenomenon and what are the chances of shielding the fundamental principle and inherent
rights of free movement in the post-Brexit process. The article argues that the 2016 February
‘New Settlement’ is taken not only as a basis for negotiations with the UK but also as a basis for
the internal law-making process of the EU. It is important because a deal with the UK will be
much smoother if the internal debate around the most crucial issues will be closed prior to the
decisive part of the Brexit negotiations. The article also argues that the EU-UK deal will probably
not be more restrictive than the ‘New Settlement’: as such, the debate is no longer only about
another opt-out for the UK but also about the unity of the remaining Member States.
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I Introduction
1 Focused Context-Setting 
Internal British procedures are in themselves challenging the Brexit process (namely whether
the British government should seek Parliamentary approval before triggering Article 50, the
‘divorce clause’ or if voting could only come after a deal with the EU has already been agreed,
in the form of ratification),2 but the real question is the future relationship between the UK and
the EU and its Member States. In the negotiation process that presumably ends in 2019,3 one
of the focal points is the free movement of persons. At the centre of the debate is clearly the
vision of the extent of the rights related to free movement. Through Brexit, the debate has
gained a  new dimension and so citizens of the world’s fifth biggest economy voted for
intervention from their government, aiming to protect their jobs and their generous welfare
system. The positive effect of migrants on the British economy has been reiterated by several
economic analysts, which can be summarised as ‘At the national level, falls in EU immigration
are likely to lead to lower living standards for the UK-born’.4 In spite of the definite economic
conclusion, voters instead questioned the idea of an ’ever closer union’ and they favoured the
traditional British ’splendid isolation’ idea of the 19th century. What prompted the fears exactly
– whether it was the powerhouse and its far-reaching competences in Brussels, or the mass
arrival of immigrating nationals from other EU countries, can’t be answered conclusively. The
reasons were manifold; political, economic, but mostly sociological and psychological, and they
have been analysed extensively.5
In fact, the UK’s ties to the EU have always been economically motivated and were loosened
in the last decades, ever since the EU started to expand its competences and more recently also
due to the biggest economic crash for more than 80 years. The UK is one of the countries to
which EU legislation applies selectively; it is the Member State with the most opt-outs.6 The UK
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2 A legal challenge – to force the government to give Parliament a vote before Article 50 is triggered – was approved
by the High Court.
3 The date might be not only be influenced by the EU-UK talks. Britain need to reach an agreement with the 163
WTO members. See for more http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-eu-trade-idUKKBN13U1GT.
4 ‘This is partly because immigrants help to reduce the deficit: they are more likely to work and pay taxes and less likely
to use public services as they are younger and better educated than the UK-born. It is also partly due to the positive
effects of EU immigrants on productivity’ see Jonathan Wadsworth, Swati Dhingra, Gianmarco Ottaviano and
John Van Reenen, ‘Brexit and the Impact of Immigration on the UK’ Centre for Economic Performance, LSE,
PaperBrexit05, May 2016, page 16.
5 Eiko Thielemann (LSE), Daniel Schade (LSE), ‘Free Movement of Persons and Migration – Report of the hearing’ held
on 21st January, 2016, LSE European Institute, Commission on the Future of Britain in Europe, London: ‘Overall,
a disparity remains, on the one hand, between the negative public perceptions of the effects of migration, and, on the
other, the more nuanced impression given by much of the available academic data, which suggests that effects are
either negligible or positive’. (Page 4).
6 http://www.euractiv.com/section/uk-europe/linksdossier/europe-a-la-carte-the-whats-and-whys-behind-uk-opt-
outs/#ea-accordion-background, download: 20 November 2016
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is not a member of the Eurozone, it has not signed up to the Economic and Monetary Union,
it is not part of the border-free Schengen area, Britain has secured opt-outs from justice and
home affairs legislation and the UK is not a signatory to the Fundamental Charter of Human
Rights.7 These are four key areas in which new laws do not automatically apply to the UK and
its citizens (the UK can opt-in to legislations according to its discretion). 
The so-called ‘New Settlement’ preceding the Brexit vote8 was (ex post facto could have
been) in fact a further example of ’opt-outs’. However, this opt-out was (could have been) very
different from the former ones, in that this was intentionally and with consent based on
reciprocity. The Brexit vote contributed to the principle of reciprocity (and the lack of it)
becoming a key feature of the whole after-Brexit regime. 
2 Main Issues Around the ‘New Settlement’ in February 2016
It is worth reiterating some of the ideas floated before and during the negotiations on the ‘New
Settlement’ in the field of free movement of persons because these ideas play a crucial role in
understanding current changes in national laws and in fine-tuning future expectations. 
As a starting point, on 10 November 2015 UK Prime Minister David Cameron launched
a discussion on the EU membership of the United Kingdom, highlighting four key areas where
the UK was seeking reforms.9 In the field of free movement, Cameron proposed that people
coming to Britain from the EU must live there and contribute for four years before they qualify
for in-work benefits or social housing, and additionally, exporting child benefit overseas should
come to an end. On 17 December 2015 the General Affairs Council discussed the British reform
proposals.10 On 2 February 2016, Donald Tusk disclosed a multi-point package of proposals,
which contained a series of measures reflecting the British requests.11 The Heads of State and
Government agreed and adopted the European Council Conclusions on Brexit (this is called the
‘New Settlement’) at their meeting on 18-19 February 2016.12
The content and uncertainties of the ‘New Settlement’ are well-known and well-
documented.13 It is important to summarise what the European Council and European
Commission have finally undertaken: 
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7 According to of Protocol 21 of the Treaties the United Kingdom and Ireland shall not take part in the adoption by
the Council of proposed measures pursuant to Title V of Part Three of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (Area of Freedom, Security and Justice), including Article 79 of TFEU aiming at developing
a common immigration policy.
8 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/02/19-euco-conclusions/, retrieved: 10-03-2016
9 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/475679/Donald_Tusk_letter.pdf,
retrieved: 02-02-2016. The four areas were: economic governance, competitiveness, sovereignty and immigration.
10 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/hu/press/press-releases/2015/12/18-euco-conclusions/, retrieved: 31-01-2016.
11 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/02/02-letter-tusk-proposal-new-settlement-uk/,
retrieved: 10-03-2016.
12 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/02/19-euco-conclusions/, retrieved: 10-03-2016.
13 See for more detail ‘House of Commons, Library, Brexit: impact across policy areas’ Briefing paper, Number 07213,
26 August 2016. Gellérné-Lukács, Éva – Töttős, Ágnes – Illés, Sándor, ‘Free movement of people and the Brexit’
(2016) 4 (65) Hungarian Geographical Bulletin, p. 421–432. DOI: 10.15201/hungeobull.65.4.9.
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– to amend Regulation 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems in order to
give Member States, with regard to the indexation of exported child benefits (Section D.,
point 2. a.) – complemented by a Commission declaration in Annex V.;
– to amend Regulation 492/2011/EU on freedom of movement for workers within the Union
to include an alert and safeguard mechanism in case of mass inflow of workers which
allows restrictions to non-contributory in-work benefits to the extent necessary for newly
arriving workers, within a period of 7 years, and for four years for each worker (Section D.,
point 2. b.) – complemented by a Commission declaration in Annex VI.;
– to adopt a proposal to complement Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union
and their family members to move and reside freely in order to fight marriages of con -
venience (Declaration of the European Commission on issues related to the abuse of the
right of free movement of persons in Annex VII).14
The ‘New Settlement’ envisaged the amendment of secondary law and also laid down Union
preference.15 It can be said that not only the UK, but potentially every receiving country was
given the opportunity to apply the alert mechanism and to control public finances through
restrictions on social benefits while maintaining the inflow of human capital. Angela Merkel
announced immediately after the February 2016 decision that Germany would also consider
the application of the restrictions on exporting family benefits.16
Union preference and mutual applicability of the safeguard are no longer self-evident and
will be subject to further negotiation, although it is emphasised by politicians that while the
‘New Settlement’ was a single, unique agreement especially to keep the UK in the EU, at that
point in time a clear consensus was reached which shall not be forgotten.
II Circumstances and Conditions Influencing the Future Relationship
with the UK
This section will examine the following topics: (i) political statements on the free movement of
persons after Brexit, (ii) development of the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union
(ECJ) on economically inactive persons, (iii) new legislative proposals of the European
Commission in the field of free movement and (iv) some highlights of changes in certain
Member States’ national laws. It is intended to present that while there is a strong support for
free movement on the political level, behind the scenes some divergent processes can be
witnessed.
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14 This topic is discussed in detail by Ágnes Töttős, ‘The Fight against Marriages of Convenience in the EU and in
Hungary’ (2015) II, Pécs Journal of International and European Law, p. 55–65.
15 Point 2. b.: ‘The future measures referred to in this paragraph should not result in EU workers enjoying less favourable
treatment than third country nationals in a comparable situation’.
16 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/23/germany-angela-merkel-eu-countries-keen-copy-uk-child-
benefit-peg, downloaded 15 April 2016.
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1 Political Statements on Free Movement of Persons
The unity and inextricability of the Single (Internal) Market has always been a  compass.
Hungary experienced it during the transitional period starting 1 May 2004 and lasting until 1
May 2011.17 During this period, there were restrictions on individual employment in the old
Member States but, serving the balance, there were restrictions on free movement of capital in
the new Member States.18 The unity has also recently been demonstrated towards Switzerland.
The Swiss referendum in 2014 called for quotas on EU immigration but the European
Commission declared that ‘This core principle of the free movement of persons is a cornerstone
of our relationship. It is a  fundamental right. It is not simply ‘negotiable’, as some tend to
believe’.19 Negotiations stalled and Switzerland now faces the dilemma of dropping its planned
immigration control or losing its full access to the EU’s Internal Market because of the guillotine
clause. The Swiss Parliament has approved rules to implement the new constitutional provision
concerning immigration aimed at remaining consistent with the Swiss-EU bilateral agreement.20
With regard to Brexit, EU political leaders – including union’s chief Brexit negotiator Michel
Barnier – repeatedly stick to the mantra that there can be no pre-negotiations before the UK
tenders its formal notice of intent to leave the EU. There is a firm stance on ’no negotiations
without notification’. It is rooted in the joint statement adopted at the informal meeting of the
27 Heads of State on 29 June 2016.21 The joint statement stresses that the four freedoms that
underpin the European Union’s internal market work together, meaning that ‘Access to the
Single Market requires acceptance of all four freedoms’.22 Peter Altmaier, Chief of the German
Chancellery has confirmed that ‘These four fundamental freedoms are at the heart of the single
market’ and ‘That means that any country that would like to participate in the single market,
basically has to accept the single market as it exists’.23 The V4 countries have a genuine, firm
standpoint which has been articulated several times that ‘the V4 countries will be
uncompromising’ and ‘Unless we feel a guarantee that these people [living and working in
Britain] are equal, we will veto any agreement between the EU and Britain’.24
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17 Dr. Gellérné dr. Lukács Éva – dr. Szigeti Borbála, Munkavállalási szabályok az EU tagállamaiban az átmeneti időszak
alatt (‘Rules of employment in EU Member States during the transition period’), (KJK Kerszöv 2005, Budapest).
18 Sándor Illés – Gábor Michalkó, ‘Relationships between international tourism and migration in Hungary: Tourism
flows and foreign property ownership’ (2008) 1 (10) Tourism Geographies, pp. 98–118.
19 Developments following the Swiss referendum on 9th February – statement by European Commissioner László
Andor on behalf of European Commission to European Parliament plenary session, Strasbourg, 26 February 2014.
20 On 16 December 2016 the Swiss parliament adopted the change in laws on foreigners.
21 http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-26-2016-INIT/en/pdf Downloaded 28 November 2016.
https://epthinktank.eu/2016/07/04/outcome-of-the-european-council-of-28-june-2016-and-the-informal-
meeting-of-27-heads-of-state-or-government-on-29-june-2016/ Downloaded: 29 November 2016.
22 Ibid, point 4.
23 http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/684801/Peter-Altmaier-freedom-movement-single-market?_ga=1.232016026.
428302222.1480426969 Downloaded: 29 November 2016
24 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/sep/17/eastern-bloc-countries-will-uphold-citizens-rights-to-live-
in-uk, downloaded: 30 September 2016
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Last but not least, the Heads of States of Government have confirmed recently that ‘We
stand firmly behind our statement of 29 June 2016 in its entirety and will continue to adhere 
to the principles laid down therein. We reiterate that any agreement will have to be based on
a balance of rights and obligations, and that access to the Single Market requires acceptance 
of all four freedoms’25.
According to British press releases, on 18 November 2016, at a conference where Theresa
May and Angela Merkel met, the latter politely rejected that giving any assurances for Britons
living in the European Union and EU citizens living in the UK to keep their rights to residence,
work and healthcare after Brexit.26 At the same time, however, when on 28 November 2016
May met Polish Prime Minister Beata Szydlo, who stressed the need to obtain guarantees for
the one million Poles in the UK, May ,refused to confirm their rights ‘insisting that the
Government must not “reveal its hand” ahead of the Brexit negotiations’.27
2 Economically Inactive Persons in the Case-Law of the Court of Justice of
the European Union
During 2013-2015 the ECJ was again faced with the question whether economically inactive
EU citizens and their families are entitled to claim social assistance and special non-contributory
benefits in the same way as migrant workers, and again the ECJ has been criticized. ‘Again’ can
be said because since 1993, when the Maastricht Treaty introduced the concept of union
citizenship, this theme has been periodically re-ignited. And ‘again’ because the ECJ in the 2000s
was criticized for being too liberal when using union citizenship to overcome the distinction
between economically active and inactive persons, and now it has been criticised for accepting
the strict limitations set out in the Residence Directive28 and for rejecting the claims in question
on this basis.29
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25 Informal meeting of the Heads of State or Government of 27 Member States, as well as the Presidents of the
European Council and the European Commission Brussels, 15 December 2016. SN 96/16
26 http://www.politico.eu/article/uk-theresa-may-pre-brexit-expats-plan-nixed-by-german-chancellor-angela-merkel-
negotiations-european-union-residence/, download: 28 November 2016
27 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/11/28/eu-must-compromise-win-good-brexit-deal-britain-rest-union-
warns/, download: 29 November 2016.
28 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the
Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending
Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC,
75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC (Text with EEA relevance).
29 Laura Gyeney, ‘The limits of Member State solidarity: The legal analysis of the Dano and the Alimanovic cases’
(manuscript, Hungarian Yearbook of International Law and European Law, 2016) (accepted for publication). Gyeney
Laura, ‘A szociális turizmuskérdése az Európai Unió bíróságának joggyakorlatában’ (‘The issue of social tourism in
the case-law of the European Court of Justice’) (2016) 2 Létünk, 167–182.
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The legal literature on union citizenship, including these cases, is copious, and tends to
focus on the boundaries of Member States’ solidarity with respect to migrant persons.30 Prior
to the Maastricht Treaty, a clear distinction prevailed between economically active and non-
active Union citizens. In the post-Maastricht era, the ECJ has unambiguously decided for the
benefit of migrant persons and contributed to extending free movement rights to economically
non-active persons.31 The ECJ followed the same line of logic in its cases: a lawfully resident
Union citizen can rely upon the equal treatment clause of the Treaty with respect to all situations
and all social benefits falling within its scope of application,32 and residence has been regarded
as lawful until an expulsion order has been initiated. The majority of legal scholars welcomed
the ECJ’s activism. It is necessary to note, however, that there were authors who have criticised
this line of interpretation: ‘the most worrying feature of the Court’s recent jurisprudence on
Union citizenship from Sala to Bidar is the absence of a convincing methodology and the
tendency to interpret secondary Community law against its wording and purpose’.33
After two decades, a clear shift can be traced.34 The Brey judgement,35 the Dano judgment36
and the Alimanovic judgment37 are the landmark cases of the new wave. The Brey case focused
on whether an economically inactive union citizen can take recourse to social assistance without
jeopardizing their right of residence. In Dano and Alimanovic there was no intention to work
and no close link with the host state and the question was whether benefits should be paid
under these circumstances. The ECJ has departed from its former line of general argumentation
and the decisive factor was the textual interpretation of Directive 2004/38/EC and the
unwarranted use of social benefits contained therein. It was logical that, under these terms and
conditions, the cases could only signal a change in the jurisprudence of the ECJ. Without
sufficient resources, the residence of a citizen of another Member State was no longer lawful,38
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30 Herwig Verschueren, ‘Free Movement or Benefit Tourism: The Unreasonable Burden of Brey’ 16 (2014) European
Journal of Migration and Law, p. 147–179. Herwig Verschueren, ‘Preventing ‘benefit tourism’ in the EU: a narrow
or broad interpretation of the possibilities offered by the ECJ in Dano?’ (2015) 52 Common Market Law Review, 
p. 363–390. Varjú Márton, Nyircsák Adrienn, ‘A tagállamokat minimális szolidaritási kötelezettség sem terheli az
uniós polgárságból eredő elvárások alapján’ http://hpops.tk.mta.hu/blog/2014/11/europai-birosag-dano-itelet.
31 Á. Castro Oliveira, ‘Workers and other persons: Step-by-step from movement to citizenship – case law 1995-2011’
39 (2002) Common Market Law Review, p. 77–127. Bjorn Kunoy, ‘Union of national citizens: the origins of the
court’s lack of avant-gardisme in the Chen case’ 43 (2006) Common Market Law Review, p. 179–190.
32 See for more detail in Gellérné Lukács Éva, Személyek szabad mozgása az Európai Unióban (‘Free movement of
persons in the EU’) (szociológiai e-könyvek, Tullius Kft 2008, Budapest). Uniós polgársággal foglalkozó fejezet
(chapter dealing with union citizenship): p. 154–174.  http://www.shp.hu/hpc/userfiles/eumunkavallalas/gellerne_
lukacs_eva_szemelyek_szabad_mozgasa_az_europai_unioban_honlap.pdf
33 Kay Hailbronner, ‘Union citizenship and access to social benefits’ 42 (2005) Common Market Law Review, 1245–
1267, p. 1251.
34 Giulia Barbone, LLB King’s College London, Dano and Alimanovic – the end of a social European Union, Posted
on January 22, 2016 https://blogs.kcl.ac.uk/kslreuropeanlawblog/?p=1012#.WGuNqpUzXX4.
35 Judgement of 19 September 2013 in Case C-140/12, Pensionversicherungsanstalt v Peter Brey.
36 Judgment of 11 November 2014 in Case 333/13 Elisabeta Dano, Florin Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig.
37 Judgment of 15 September 2015 in Case 67/14 Jobcenter Berlin Neukölln v Nazifa Alimanovic and Others.
38 Para 51. of the Alimanovic case.
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or even if it was lawful under Article 14 (4) b) of Directive 2004/38/EC, benefits were
legitimately rejected on the basis of Article 24 (2). The key issue was that the benefit which had
been claimed qualified as social assistance and this qualification made it impossible to count on
it as part of sufficient resources. It was irrelevant that, on the basis of Regulation 883/2004/EC,
it should have been granted. The ECJ disregarded the necessity of individual assessment in
Alimanovic and the concrete effect of the claimed benefits on the sustainability of the social
assistance system.39
It seems that the ECJ has recently faced rather clear-cut cases; the claimants were real non-
actives, and, for these clear-cut cases, the Residence Directive gave a clear-cut answer. It is not
that a gate has forever been closed to job-seekers, students or ex-workers; it seems rather
a confirmation that Member States have no unlimited responsibility for migrant persons. What
is more interesting for the future how the ECJ or the Union legislator will think it over and how
it will clarify the following loose ends:
– the definition of economically inactive persons versus job-seekers, 
– the relationship between Directive 2004/38/EC and Regulation 883/2004/EC, hence if
a  benefit will qualify as social assistance in terms of the Directive and special non-
contributory benefit under Regulation 883/2004/EC at the same time, the relationship
(hierarchy) between these two instruments needs to be solved, and finally,
– how the necessity for individual assessment will be regulated in detail, when it is precisely
this condition that can be set aside. 
Why this issue is so extensively discussed here? Because the outcome of the Brexit vote was
most heavily burdened by the issue of social benefits to migrants, especially for those who are
not working. The UK was one of the leading lobbyists in this field. In 2013 ‘Britain and Germany
have joined forces to demand an end to the abuse by so-called ‘benefits tourists’ of the European
Union’s free movement directive’.40 The European Commission launched research on the impact
of non-actives on the social security systems of the Member States which rejected the welfare
magnet hypothesis.41 However, this has not changed the immense political weight of the
question – the best proof of this is Brexit itself. 
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39 Para 59. of the Alimanovic case. ‘(…) no such individual assessment is necessary in circumstances such as those at
issue in the main proceedings’.
40 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/10014508/Britain-and-Germany-demand-EU-cracks-down-on-benefits-
tourism.html. Britain and Germany demand EU cracks down on ‘benefits tourism’. 24 April 2013. Theresa May as
home state secretary has initiated the process. Downloaded: 20 November 2016.
41 A fact finding analysis on the impact on the Member States’ social security systems of the entitlements of 
non-active intra-EU migrants to special non-contributory cash benefits and healthcare granted on the basis 
of residence, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion via DG Justice Framework Contract, Final report
submitted by ICF GHK in association with Milieu Ltd, 14 October 2013 (revised on 16 December 2013).
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3 The EU ‘Internal Processes’
The European Commission have launched two proposals in 2016 that forecast considerable
changes in the field of free movement. The first was the amendment of the Posting of Workers
Directive 96/71/EC in March and the second the amendment of the social security coordination
regime (Regulation 883/2004/EC) in December.42 Both have been articulated by the European
Commission as means of enhancing the protection of workers and fairness within the Internal
Market.43 It is problematic however, that both proposals could be the subject of an East-West
disagreement, more precisely a disagreement between sending and receiving countries. 
a) Social benefits — proposal for the amendment of Regulation 883/2004/EC
In the field of social benefits, first the ‘New Settlement’ is to be recalled. It contained the
following: ‘Member States may reject claims for social assistance by EU citizens from other
Member States who do not enjoy a right of residence or are entitled to reside on their territory
solely because of their job-search’.44 This clear statement bears similarities with the conclusions
of the recent case-law of the ECJ and even goes beyond it: it excludes, from the beneficiaries of
social assistance, job-seekers by definition. 
The proposal of the European Commission for the amendment of the current framework
mirrors the above tendencies. Preamble (5a) states that ‘In order to improve legal clarity for citizens
and institutions, a codification of this case law is necessary.’ In order to provide for clarity, the
insertion of Article 4 (2) is suggested: ‘2. A Member State may require that the access of an
economically inactive person residing in that Member State to its social security benefits 
be subject to the conditions of having a  right to legal residence as set out in Directive
2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of
citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory
of the Member States.’
Article 4 (2) refers to economically inactive people and provides for restrictive measure in
their respect. Preamble (5a) sets forth that ‘The verification of the legal right of residence should
be carried out in accordance with the requirement of Directive 2004/38/EC’. Clearly, the
European Commission proposes to set up a hierarchy between Directive 2004/38/EC and
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42 Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 96/71/EC of The European Parliament and of the Council of 16
December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services, COM(2016) 128
final. Proposal for a Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 on the coordination of social security
systems and regulation (EC) No 987/2009 laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation (EC) 
No 883/2004 (COM(2016)815 final). Amendment of the regulations was discussed in the past, too, but from
different angles, see Jos Bergham-Paul Schoukens (eds.), The social security of moving researchers (Acco Nederland
2011, Den Haag).
43 http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=hu&catId=569&newsId=2699&furtherNews=yes, downloaded: 
15 December 2016. With regard the posting directive the Commission believes that these changes are necessary to
ensure better protection for posted workers and to eliminate wage differences between posted and local workers,
which can lead to unfair competition between companies.
44 Section D., point 1. a.
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Regulation 883/2004/EC in favour of the Directive. It entails the following chain of events: if
a migrant claims social benefit, first the conditions of their legal residence will be examined,
including the existence of sufficient resources. If the person would not meet the sufficient
resources requirements of the Directive, their residence would be deemed unlawful and access
to social security benefits would be denied. 
There is the proposal for hierarchy, but no definition of an economically inactive person is
given. Preamble (5a) states that ‘For these purposes, an economically inactive citizen should be
clearly distinguished from a jobseeker, whose right of residence is conferred directly by Article
45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union’. But this text is not at all reflected
in Article 4 (2), and so the situation of those who want work but do not have work shall be
decided case-by-case, whether they are job-seekers in terms of the TFEU or not. If job-seeking
is treated as part of work statuses, the situation becomes even more complicated.45 For example,
a member state would not be precluded from considering somebody economically inactive if
they had been working for years but became a jobseeker for more than 6 months, or even
a family member who is the primary carer of the children. Is a person who, based on previous
insurance, employment or residence receives benefits under Regulation 883/2004/EC but is out
of work, economically inactive? The personal scope seems obscure, which can give rise to
different (even unnecessarily restrictive) decisions in individual cases and could influence all
sub-schemes of social security.
There is no mention of individual assessment either. Obviously the individual assessment
test is part of the Residence Directive; it should be inherent in the verification process, but after
Alimanovic, the question is clear: in which cases can the personal test be disregarded? This
issue is not dealt with in the proposal, which could probably lead to the complete elimination
of the test in practice. 
Probably, if these proposals will be accepted by the EU Member States (including at present
the UK) and the restriction of rights of economically inactive persons will become a reality, it
is may facilitate Brexit negotiations.
b) Posted workers’ rights — proposal for the amendment of Directive 96/71/EC 
In the field of posting, the Commission proposed that each posted worker needs to receive the
same remuneration as a worker of the host state in the same position (equal pay for equal work).
The wage requirement exists at present as well, but it is confined to the minimum wage; it does
not prescribe ‘same remuneration’. Also, the Commission proposed that if the anticipated length
of posting exceeds 24 months, the labour law of the host Member State can be applied. At
present, there is no time limitation for the duration and choice of labour law. Ten national
Parliaments, mainly from Central and Eastern European (CEE), signalled their concerns
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shows that the present state of affairs is not very clear.
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regarding subsidiarity, which triggered the yellow-card procedure.46 The parliaments argued
that the proposal impinges on their national jurisdiction in setting wage levels. It was also
emphasised that wage difference is an economic factor – in the same way as price difference in
the field of free movement of goods or the level of capital adequacy in the field of free movement
of capital. As none of the latter is considered to result in unfair competition then why should
wage difference? Economic analyst Bruegel confirmed that ‘If a version of the ‘same pay at the
same place’ principle is introduced, European firms would become less competitive globally,
due to the less competition and the associated efficiency losses’.47 This opinion is also shared by
Business Europe, the association of national business federations of 34 European countries. The
approach of the European Commission is shared by workers’ representations and civil
organisations, also from CEE countries: ‘The rule of equal pay for equal work in the same
workplace should apply in the field of work migration too – and that without exception’.48
The European Commission disregarded the concerns of national parliaments when it
declared that the proposal did not breach the subsidiarity principle.49 Consequently, the
negotiations of the proposal in the Council working groups have started again under the Slovak
Presidency. In the event of approval – which is likely sooner or later, because the CEE countries
alone do not have enough votes to block it – the conditions of posting will change to the
detriment of CEE-established companies. It is important to note that CEE-established is not
equivalent to CEE-owned companies; there are several companies that are subsidiaries of their
Western parent or have simply been established by Western groups of owners who employ
a CEE workforce using this construction. Posted workers are therefore usually low- or semi-
skilled workers who live in CEE countries and only work temporarily in other countries through
posting and it is likely that they will lose their job before they could enjoy the strengthened
protection that is envisioned by the equal pay for equal work principle. Their work will be taken
over by the low- or semi-skilled workers of the present host states or they will continue as
undeclared workers. Undeclared work is already a huge problem in the EU,50 and if artificial
compensatory regulations are introduced it could grow ever larger. 
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46 Member States’ national parliaments can disagree with a proposal up to eight weeks after its publication. Under
this ‘yellow card’ procedure, a  total of one-third of the votes assigned to national parliaments requires the
Commission to re-examine its proposal, as a result of which it can amend or withdraw it. Poland would be mostly
hit because out of the estimated 1.9 million posted workers approximately 300,000 are Polish citizens.
47 http://bruegel.org/2016/03/social-dumping-and-posted-workers-a-new-clash-within-the-eu/. Elena Vaccarino
and Zsolt Darvas, ‘“Social dumping” and posted workers: a new clash within the EU’ 7 March, 2016. Downloaded
29 September 2016.
48 http://migrationonline.cz/en/free-movement-of-workers-in-the-european-union-in-the-context-of-the-amended-
directive-on-the-posting-of-workers. Martin Rozumek, ‘Free Movement of Workers in the European Union in the
Context of the Amended Directive on the Posting of Workers’ 5 September 2016.
49 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2546_en.htm. Downloaded 15 December 2016.
50 http://bruegel.org/2016/03/social-dumping-and-posted-workers-a-new-clash-within-the-eu/. Vaccarino, Darvas
(n 47). Also adds: ‘The elephant in the room is undeclared work, which is a much bigger problem than possible
problems caused by posted workers on all three accounts: fairness of competition, protection of the rights of mobile
workers and possible negative impacts on declared home country workers’.
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Here, it should be noted that the UK could be a supporter of the position of CEE countries
and join in to block the proposal. The UK also supported the blocking minority against the
Posting Enforcement Directive.51 Competitiveness is a key issue for the UK, and setting wage
levels in EU legislation could be an issue that would not fit its economic principles. Additionally,
if wage levels are artificially set and CEE workers would lose their jobs, it could be feared that
these low and semi-skilled workers will head towards the UK, which could also generate
tensions. 
4 Highlights of Recent Changes in National Laws Related to free Movement
and Benefits
Hungarian migrant workers are employed in the largest numbers in Germany, the UK, and
Austria,52 and our focus is on the trends in these countries. It is argued that Germany and Austria
have introduced restrictive internal laws on access to social benefits for migrant persons which,
regarding its objectives, goes parallel to what the UK tried to achieve. 
Germany operates a  wide social net which covers all social security risks, including
temporary inability of persons to finance their living. However, a new bill has been drafted in
October 2016.53 EU citizens should in principle be exempt from Hartz IV benefits and social
assistance if they did not work here or had acquired social insurance claims through previous
work, according to the draft bill. Only after a period of five years, if their stay had been
consolidated without state support, should citizens of the EU be entitled to benefits. For EU
citizens, who are excluded from social assistance in the future, the draft law foresees a new
entitlement to one-time bridging: for the last four weeks, the affected persons should receive
aid to meet their immediate needs for food, shelter, body and health care. At the same time they
would be given a loan for the return trip to their home country, where they could then apply
for social assistance. It is worth noting that not only EU migrants are entitled to these social
benefits but also asylum seekers. In central Germany, every fourth currently eligible person is
a  foreigner54 and out of the 1.5 million foreigner beneficiaries 500,000 are third-country
nationals. 
The situation in Austria is also very complex. It is worth recalling that on 1 May 2011 the
transitional period, during which access to Austria’s labour market had been restricted for
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51 Directive 2014/67/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the enforcement of
Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services and amending
Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 on administrative cooperation through the Internal Market Information System.
52 Illés Sándor, ‘Külföldiek az Európai Unióból’ (2001) 2 (79) Statisztikai Szemle, pp. 162–177. Illés, Sándor – Kincses,
Áron, ‘Hungary as a receiving country for circulars’ (2012) 2 (61) Hungarian Geographical Bulletin, pp. 197-218.
53 http://www.zeit.de/politik/2016-04/andrea-nahles-eu-buerger-sozialleistungen. ‘Bundesarbeitsministerin Andrea
Nahles (SPD) will den Sozialhilfeanspruch von Ausländern aus anderen EU-Staaten drastisch beschränken.’
Downloaded: 10 October 2016.
54 http://www.mdr.de/nachrichten/wirtschaft/inland/mehr-hartz-iv-auslaender-fluechtlinge-100.html. Downloaded:
10 October 2016.
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workers from the EU-8 newcomer Member States, expired. Social and wage dumping was feared
in two scenarios: (i) when Austrian companies employ workers from the EU-8, disregard
relevant laws and pay lower wages than provided for in collective agreements, and (ii) foreign
companies post workers to Austria but pay remuneration (minimum wages) applicable in their
country of origin and not in accordance with the Austrian wage level. The initiative stressed the
protection of workers’ rights (the enforcement of the ’equal pay for equal work’ principle) but
also that the competitive advantage of these undertakings through paying lower wages was
a relevant push factor. In 2014, one of the flagship initiatives of the government was therefore
the launch of the so-called Act on Fight against Social Dumping.55 The law contains penalties
if minimum wages and salaries (as provided for in the collective agreements) are not paid
and if documents (e.g. relating to employment contracts and insured status) are not available
in German. The new changes to Austrian law enter into force on 1st January 2017. In essence,
the authorities will gain power from more control mechanisms and further measures to fight
against wage and social dumping, and the lessons are transferable, therefore, in June 2011,
Austria and Germany signed an agreement designed to enhance cooperation between Austrian
and German authorities in the field of posted workers. ‘The improved cooperation includes
speeding up the investigation of relevant facts and penalties for employers engaged in wage and
social dumping, especially when major forms of organised social fraud are taking place’. 56
Moreover, conditions of lawful residence have also been tightened recently.57
The UK enjoys special status in Europe. Its population is rapidly growing and demographic
ageing hits it less than any other country. The UK population is projected to increase by 9.7
million over the next 25 years, from an estimated 64.6 million in mid-2014 to 74.3 million in
mid-2039. This is a growth of more than 10%.58 Over the 10-year period to mid-2024, the UK
population is projected to increase by 4.4 million to 69.0 million and it is projected to reach 
70 million by mid-2027.59 It puts tremendous pressure on public services such as housing,
education, healthcare and social assistance. The UK first passed new laws regarding residence-
related benefits in 2004. Prior to 1st May 2004, Union citizens who were present in the UK
possessed the right of residence in terms of European Community law, and they needed to
evidence their intentions to live permanently in the UK to successfully stand the Habitual
Residence Test (HRT). From 1st May 2004, in response to concerns about the impact of the
enlargement of the European Union, HRT legislation was amended. The change on 1st of
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55 https://www.wko.at/Content.Node/Service/Arbeitsrecht-und-Sozialrecht/Arbeitsrecht/Entgelt/Lohn-_und_
Sozialdumping_Begriff_und_Ueberpruefung.html. Download: 10 September 2016.
56 http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/hu/observatories/emcc/case-studies/tackling-undeclared-work-in-europe/law-
against-wage-and-social-dumping-austria. Downloaded: 10 September 2016.
57 See for more TRANSWELL project http://www.bath.ac.uk/casp/projects/transwel/index.html. Downloaded 10
September 2016.
58 http://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationprojections/bulletins/
nationalpopulationprojections/2015-10-29#tab-Main-points. Download 10 March 2016.
59 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/29/uk-population-expected-to-rise-by-almost-10-million-in-25-
years. Download 10 March 2016.
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January 2004 meant that a prerequisite was introduced before the original test: an initial test to
determine whether the person has a ‘right to reside’, and then the original HRT is carried out.
Any person who does not have a right to reside automatically fails the HRT and consequently
cannot qualify for residence-based benefits.60 Additionally, on 1 May 2014 restrictions were
introduced for claiming social benefits. British commentators were quite clear regarding the
intentions of the legislative amendment: ‘On January 1 new rules were introduced to stop new
arrivals claiming benefits for up to three months, to deter people from coming from Romania
and Bulgaria when work restrictions were lifted.’61
III Projections and Scenarios
The question is which EU or UK citizens and how they can be admitted to the UK or the EU,
or whether there will be a continued application of the EU free movement rules. The form and
content of the cooperation agreement between the EU and the UK will surely be decisive for the
free movement of persons. Some experts believe that the current forms of cooperation – either
the European Economic Area model or the Switzerland model – could set the example for the
new relations between Britain and the EU. This solution would inherently include free movement
of persons and the competence of the European Court of Justice. Some commentators suggest,
instead, a ‘continental partnership’ that does not include the four basic freedoms of the EU (free
movement of goods, services, persons – including workers – and capital).62 A mixed model can
also be envisaged, in which security and defence matters and paying into the EU budget could
be seen as a concession and used as leverage for access to the Internal Market.63 In the last
months, commentators have even suggested that the UK should secure a CETA-like agreement
(deal) with the EU, by which Canada gained access to the single market without accepting
freedom of movement. It has been put forward as a possible post-Brexit model for UK trade
with the EU. In this case, the issues of living and working conditions and access to public services
or welfare would be ignored.64
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60 Éva Lukács Gellérné, ‘Free Movement of Persons – a Synthesis’ 51-84, in Réka Somssich, Tamás Szabados (eds.),
Central and Eastern European Countries After and Before the Accession, Volume I, (Department of Private
International Law and European Economic Law, Faculty of Law, ELTE University 2011, Budapest).
61 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2632914/Child-benefit-worth-30million-paid-Britain-families-EU-
Cameron-admits-impossible-stop-it.html. Downloaded: 10 July 2016.
62 http://euranetplus-inside.eu/eu-uk-battle-over-free-movement-of-workers-after-brexit/. Downloaded: 30 November
2016.
63 http://euranetplus-inside.eu/eu-uk-battle-over-free-movement-of-workers-after-brexit/. Downloaded: 30 November
2016.
64 The CETA is a free trade agreement and not a customs union: important areas are out of its scope; it is evidently 
not full access to the Internal Market.
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1 Free Movement – Residence and Employment Rights
In the field of free movement, EU law contains a dual regime. For intra-EU migration, Directive
2004/38/EC and Regulation 492/2011/EC are in force. These legal sources are applicable on the
basis of reciprocity. For incoming migrants from third countries, there is a complete different
set of common rules. Several directives have been adopted that grant rights unilaterally.65 The
EU follows a selective and sectoral approach; it grants admission for researchers, highly-skilled
workers, seasonal workers, intra-corporate transferees and unremunerated categories if they
meet the requirements laid down in these directives. Procedure rules have also been harmonised
through the Single Permit Directive (SPD)66 and, in addition to access to the labour market,
equal treatment is also granted in several other fields.67 Long-term resident third-country
nationals, for example, enjoy equal treatment with respect to employment, education, vocational
training, social protection and assistance, as well as enhanced protection against expulsion.
These directives do not give workers access to the EU labour market in general: low and semi-
skilled third-country nationals are admitted by each Member State at its discretion. However,
the SPD covers all workers that have been admitted, meaning that the comprehensive set of
rights is granted to almost all third-country workers employed on the basis of national or EU
law.68
This sectoral, unilateral system means that, even in the absence of any contractual
relationship with the EU, UK nationals who would meet the requirements laid down in the
directives would have access to the EU labour market and would also enjoy equal treatment in
the designated areas. Long-term residence status could also be required by UK nationals.
Reciprocity as such would not bind the UK in this case.
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65 Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification, Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third
country nationals who are long-term residents, Directive 2004/114/EC on the conditions of admission of 
third country nationals for the purposes of studies, pupil exchange, unremunerated training or voluntary service;
Directive 2005/71/EC on a specific procedure for admitting third country nationals for the purposes of scientific
research, Directive 2009/50/EC on the conditions of entry and residence of third country nationals for the purposes
of highly qualified employment, Directive 2014/66/EU on conditions of entry and residence of third country nationals
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country nationals for the purpose of employment as seasonal workers, Directive 2016/801/EU on the conditions of
entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of research, studies, training, voluntary service, pupil
exchange schemes or educational projects and au pairing. Directives 2004/114/EC and 2005/71/EC are repealed by
this Directive with effect from 24 May 2018 when the transposition deadline expires. Yves Pascouau, ‘Intra-EU
mobility of third-country nationals State of play and prospects’ (April 2013) http://www.epc.eu/documents/
uploads/pub_3496_intra-eu_mobility_of_third-country_nationals.pdf, download 23 November 2016.
66 Directive 2011/98/EU on a single application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside
and work in the territory of a Member State and on a common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing
in a Member State.
67 Kees Groenendijk, ‘Equal treatment of workers from third countries: the added value of the Single Permit Directive’
(2015) 16 ERA Forum, 547–561, DOI 10.1007/s12027-015-0403-2.
68 Ibid, p. 547. The UK has opt-out in this field; it adopted a regime for all third-country nationals.
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Because of the unilateral grant of rights, EU nationals would not enjoy the same rights in
the UK. Moreover, theoretically the UK could introduce different rules for each EU country.
Honestly, it would be unprecedented: the UK’s Immigration Rules also have horizontal
application. What is more awaited is to have a common system for EU citizens. The content
could be positioned between two models or ’extremes’. The first is the continued application of
the present EU free movement rules and the second is the extension of present third-country
immigration rules to EU citizens. The latter would definitely be the more restrictive solution.
The ultimate path for a renewed relationship is subject to negotiations, but the prevailing
opinion is that ‘some migration controls [are] reconcilable with the concept of free movement
of workers and the right to reside’.69
The UK’s Immigration Rules for non-EU nationals are quite strict: these require a minimum
level of sufficient resources for economically non-active persons (including family members),
namely: a minimum annual income of GBP 18,600. The requested sum is well-understandable
if we recall the UK’s tax credit system.70 In the UK, anyone who works for low wage can obtain
‘in-work benefits’ amounting to a maximum of GBP 6-7,000 annually.71 ‘In-work benefits’ can
be claimed by low wage earners whose annual income does not exceed GBP 15,000. The
underlying principle of the tax credit system is to provide for a minimum level of protection
(income) for citizens, in other words, to guarantee a safety net – a minimum subsistence level
of GBP 15,000 annually – for everyone.72 If the person’s income exceeds 15 thousand pounds,
no credits are granted. Based on these rules, non-EU nationals cannot avail of tax credits if they
have a temporary stay visa. It was presumed in the Brexit process that a major limitation of these
benefits would affect the financial motivation of potential migrants with regard to migration to
the UK.73 However, this has not been regarded as primary motivation: according to the Oxford
Migration Observatory, the first pull factor is employment, (78%), followed by studying and
family reunification.74
Additionally, most non-EU visa categories set the requirement of some English language
skills, which could also exclude many EU workers. Additionally, the points-based system is
designed to channel in mostly skilled workers who have already obtained a job offer. It can’t be
overlooked that non-EU citizen workers cannot be employed in the United Kingdom as
unskilled labour (for ‘low- skilled jobs’)75, meaning that these jobs are available – in the absence
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69 http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/NewsInsights/Publications/2016/08/Brexit-Free-Movement-of-Persons-
FIAFR-080516.pdf. Downloaded: 30 November 2016.
70 https://www.gov.uk/topic/benefits-credits/tax-credits. (The official UK governmental page for tax credits.)
71 Child Tax Credit, Working Tax Credit and Universal Credit
72 Gellérné Lukács Éva, Töttős Ágnes, A Brexit elkerülése érdekében létrejött uniós megállapodás szabad mozgást érintő
kérdései magyar szemmel (kézirat, 2016 április).
73 http://archive.openeurope.org.uk/Article/Page/en/LIVE?id=22825&page=PressReleases#. ‘Restricting these in-
work benefits would make a huge difference to potential migrants’ financial incentives while allowing free movement
to stand.
74 Downloaded: April 13 2016. http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/commentary/pulling-power-why-are-
eu-citizens-migrating-uk
75 https://www.gov.uk/tier-2-general/overview Retrieved: 11-03-2016.
ELJ_2016-1__0  2017.03.13.  17:53  Page 156
of British workers to take them up – mostly for EU citizen workers. The present assumption is
that low-skilled jobs are met by UK and EU nationals, therefore non-EU nationals are accepted
instead for jobs requiring special knowledge. The assumptions are based on statistics which
show, for example, that 70% of workers from the EU-8 Member States are in low-skilled jobs and
even those with qualifications can only get jobs with lower educational requirements. This
reflects the complexity of being overqualified and the relatively poor English language skills 
of new EU migrants (whether real or perceived). According to the House of Commons, the
demand of the British economy for low an semi-skilled workers needs to be satisfied and if 
the present (more restrictive) immigration rules were introduced for EU nationals it is
questionable whether the demand for low-skilled workers of the economy will be met.76
There are countless legal options between the two extremes, from allowing workers only
through the EEA-model to a special British model. British politicians emphasise that there must
be a genuine British model and several possible scenarios have come to light.77 However, it
needs to be kept in mind that the scenario has to be acceptable for all the EU Member States,
both sending and receiving states. The EU is burdened with very divergent interests concerning
free movement of persons, and pressure is present regardless of Brexit. The remaining EU
Member States, when declaring their positions in the Brexit process, evidently give signals to
their partners of their priorities in this field in general. The different interests of sending and
receiving states within the EU have to be reconciled before the two-year long negotiation
process comes to an end. Free movement of workers and the self-employed while they exercise
economic activity will not be questioned by any of the remaining Member States; it is common
ground that the 1958 Rome principles are acknowledged by all states. Equal treatment 
(‘as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment’78) and
searching for work is also a prerogative which derives directly from the Treaty. Benefits for
workers, job-seekers or economically inactive persons are, however, not explicitly included 
in the Treaty and are a  completely different matter. National actions also confirm that 
here a separate approach is followed. It is expected that the EU as a whole is on the edge of
making a definite shift towards a more restrictive approach in the field of benefits.79
2 Social Security Coordination and Cross-Border Healthcare 
Polish Prime Minister Beata Szydlo brought in social security coordination as a new element of
negotiations by ‘adding that there must also be “proper coordination of social security systems
on both sides of the English Channel” as part of the agreement’.80
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77 Sherman and Sterling LLP, ‘Brexit: Free Movement of Persons’ Client Publication, 5 August 2016. This paper foresees
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78 Article 45 (2) TFEU.
79 See the following point (3.2. social security coordination).
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Social security coordination is a  complicated set of rules which faces now the first
substantive amendment since its entry into force (1 May 2010).81 It covers all relevant risks and
benefits and is hallmarked by famous instruments like the European Health Insurance Card. The
UK attempted to limit the export of family benefits, and this appeared in the ‘New Settlement’.
However, it not only had problems with exporting family benefits but also with the
reimbursement of unemployment benefits.82 In a nutshell, the Regulation lays down that if
a migrant worker has worked in a country and became unemployed but subsequently returns
to their country of origin then they can claim unemployment benefits there. However, the
benefit paid by the country of origin has to be reimbursed by the former country of employ -
ment.83 The UK’s view is that reimbursement could be claimed only if the unemployed person
would be eligible for benefits under UK law, which requires a period of two years’ work for
eligibility. Consequently, Department for Work and Pensions said: ‘This Government does not
pay benefits to someone in another country when they would not have been eligible for them
in the UK’.84 Millions of pounds were claimed from the UK by Poland, the Czech Republic and
Slovakia, but a  solution has not really been found for this issue. It is noteworthy that the
European Commission proposed, in its December 2016 amendment package, the complete
termination of the reimbursement system. It would definitely go along with the UK’s desire.
Moreover, reciprocity comes up here again. Regulation 883/2004/EC is complemented by
Regulation 1231/2010/EC, which extends its scope to those third-country nationals who are
legally residing in one EU Member State but ‘are in a situation which is not confined in all
respects within a single Member State’.85 These rights are granted unilaterally. Consequently,
similarly to residence rights, if a UK national is treated as a third-country national, they could
avail themselves of Regulation 1231/2010/EC to claim rights if the requirements are met, and
no reciprocity needs to be provided for EU nationals in the UK. 
The reciprocal application of Regulation 883/2004/EC could in principle work with certain
exceptions in the post-Brexit era, especially if the presently ongoing modification process will
end in favour of the concerns of the UK. In the event of rejection of its reciprocal application
(which seems unlikely), the precise examination of all rights will become necessary, along with
deciding on competence and procedural rules in EU-UK relations or in UK – individual member
state relations (possibly through bilateral social security agreements). In my opinion, the latter
would not be beneficial for CEE countries; they need to argue for an EU-UK horizontal social
security agreement in the absence of reciprocal application of the Regulation. 
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Finally, there is Directive 2011/24 on cross-border healthcare86 that became an integral
part of the Internal Market and is also intertwined with a thousand threads with the Regulation.
It enhances the free movement of patients in order to obtain healthcare in other Member States,
combined with reimbursement by the insurance fund of the country of affiliation.87 The fate of
this piece of legislation can hardly be forecasted because its usage is quite limited; however, its
potential is growing and it contains business opportunities, from which the UK might not wish
to be excluded.
IV Conclusion
The article has aimed at arguing that restricting the free movement of persons is part of a global
trend and is not a Brexit-specific issue. Restrictions in this field date historically back to new
accessions – including those of Portugal and Greece, the EU-8 states, and finally to Romania,
Bulgaria and Croatia. Moreover, there is the relatively fresh situation evolved after the 2014
referendum with Switzerland, where the restriction of immigration was also voted for. The EU
declared that the acceptance of all four freedoms is a prerequisite for gaining access to the
internal market and hasn’t shown any signs of softening its firm stance on the matter. If
Switzerland unilaterally pulls out of the free movement of persons agreement, the guillotine
clause will result in the annulment of every other agreement. Switzerland seems to be left with
a choice of all or nothing.
Brexit has been an engine for generating rapid reactions from politicians in other Member
States, who emphasised individually and as the European Council that ‘access to the Single
Market requires acceptance of all four freedoms’.88 It must be kept in mind, however, that the
concept of free movement as a freedom contains at least two layers: that of persons and that of
benefits. The European Council has made it clear in February 2016 in the ‘New Settlement’ that
the ‘Free movement of workers within the Union is an integral part of the internal market which
entails, among others, the right for workers of the Member States to accept offers of
employment anywhere within the Union’. However, it has also been laid down that ‘free move -
ment of workers may be restricted by measures proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued’ and
‘Member States have the possibility of refusing to grant social benefits to persons who exercise
their right to freedom of movement solely in order to obtain Member States’ social assistance
although they do not have sufficient resources to claim a right of residence’.89 The Heads of
State and Governments accepted unanimously that the free movement of workers is protected
while economically inactive persons’ free movement rights are subjected to the fulfilment of
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86 Directive 2011/24/EU on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare.
87 Gellérné Lukács Éva, Gyeney Laura, ‘Határon átnyúló egészségügyi ellátás az Európai Unióban’ (2014) 2–3 (52)
Egészségügyi Gazdasági Szemle, p. 24–35.
88 Informal meeting of the Heads of State or Government of 27 Member States, as well as the Presidents of the
European Council and the European Commission Brussels, 15 December 2016. SN 96/16.
89 New Settlement, Section D, introduction and points 1. a-b.
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residence conditions (especially that of sufficient resources). Finally, it has been set forth that
certain factors, such as reducing unemployment, protecting vulnerable workers and the risk of
undermining the sustainability of social security systems, might provide a legitimate basis for
limiting the free movement of persons, workers or their benefits. The ‘New Settlement’ itself has
confirmed a structured approach to free movement. 
The article argues that the 2016 February ‘New Settlement’ is taken not only as a basis for
negotiations with the UK but also as a basis for the internal law-making process of the EU. Both
the EU’s internal processes and the ECJ took stock towards a restrictive approach for social
rights of economically inactive persons. The ECJ ’s case-law from 2013–2015 confirmed that
economically inactive persons and those job-seekers whose job search has exceeded 6 months
could not have claimed to be lawfully resident without having sufficient resources. The ECJ has
referred to the Residence Directive as the main source of its decisions. The most important
issue was the determination of ’social assistance’ within the meaning of the Residence Directive.
The ECJ declared that a  special non-contributory benefit that falls within Regulation
883/2004/EC and to which migrant persons are entitled, can, at the same time, be ‘social
assistance’ within the meaning of the Residence Directive. This express categorisation has
indicated a shift in the relationship between the two instruments, namely, that Member States
can prioritise the application of the Directive. The new proposal of the Commission on the
amendment of Regulation 883/2004/EC made it clear that Member States can make the award
of benefits dependent upon lawful residence and sufficient resources. If accepted, this will lead
to the exclusion of economically inactive persons from a range of social benefits. Finally, if we
recall the ‘New Settlement’, it is exactly what it contains: ‘Member States may reject claims for
social assistance by EU citizens from other Member States who do not enjoy a right of residence
or are entitled to reside on their territory solely because of their job-search’.90
The article examines what the chances are of shielding the fundamental principle and
inherent rights of free movement in the post-Brexit process, especially for CEE migrant citizens.
The assumption is that the ‘New Settlement’ could be used as a springboard for Britain to start
its Brexit negotiations but it is highly probable that there will be no further restrictions. In my
view, first, EU citizens currently resident in the UK or UK citizens in another Member State
would be permitted to stay. Second, for newcomers, there will be a reciprocal, common set of
rules which will allow full free access to each other’s labour markets. The demand for low- and
semi-skilled workers in the economy shall be met. Preference for EU workers in the UK 
and preference for UK workers in the EU will be granted. However, there is a considerable
chance that non-contributory income support benefits (‘in-work benefits’) will not be available
for a certain period of time (also on a reciprocal basis within EU-UK relations). No cash benefits
will be paid for first job-seekers, but placement services will be available (job-search is
a prerogative under the TFEU). These rules will be horizontally applicable within the EU, too.
Restrictive rules will be introduced for economically inactive persons (including family
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members), also in the whole EU. The latter will be admitted to obtain lawful residence or to
join the worker/self-employed person only if sufficient resources to fund their living are
guaranteed and recourse to means-tested public resources will only be allowed in case of short-
term temporary difficulties.
Short-term social security benefits, such as sick-pay, will be provided for the period of the
economic activity, and unemployment benefit for a period of a maximum six months after
having become economically inactive (unemployed). Long-term benefits such as invalidity
benefits resulting from work accident or occupational disease and old-age benefits will be
awarded and even exported to the country of origin. This is ongoing practice in almost every
EU country. Acquired rights can’t disappear in thin air; this is a horizontal, EU neutral issue.
Family benefits will be granted in full but only if the respective family members reside within
the UK together with the worker, or within the EU together with the worker. 
The ‘New Settlement’ introduced the commitment to regulate the indexation of family
benefits which are paid for children living outside the UK. The reasons were clear: the UK
wanted to stop the export of, or wanted to export a reduced child benefit in these cases.91 The
financial scale of the problem did not seem to be outstanding: out of 13 million children covered
by benefits, only 35,000 live in other EU countries.92 However, the issue received a great amount
of attention and was one of the main topics of the Brexit referendum debate. Whether there will
be export of child/family benefits or only in indexed amounts will be dependent upon the
current negotiations within the EU on the amendment of Regulation 883/2004/EC. The original
proposal of the Commission does not contain indexation, but there will surely be attempts to
introduce this method for the EU as a whole. The UK was not the only country highly concerned
in this field: ‘Following the council’s resolution, adjusting child benefits to living costs in
recipients’ home country will also be possible in Germany from 2020,’ said Marcus Weinberg,
a Christian Democrat spokesman on family affairs. ‘That isn’t just appropriate, it’s also fair.’93
Other social assistance, such as housing benefits and subsistence support will not be available
for economically inactive persons. A considerable cloud remains over whether workers will
qualify for these benefits. The amendment of Regulation 492/2011/EU is not on the agenda
now, meaning that the concept of ‘social advantages’ is fully valid within the EU. Germany,
France and the Scandinavian states would not be interested in changing the regime towards
UK nationals but could attempt to change it towards all EU nationals; no prognosis can yet be
given.
It might gain in importance that the UK Prime Minister, Theresa May, was the Home
Secretary in 2013 when, together with her counterparts in Germany, Austria and the Nether -
lands, they campaigned for tighter restrictions to migrants’ access to social benefits and other
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exported-EU.html#ixzz45ViZrb9A. Downloaded 1 April 2016.
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benefit-peg. Downloaded 15 April 2016.
ELJ_2016-1__0  2017.03.13.  17:53  Page 161
state-funded services.94 The above-proposed amendment of Regulation 883/2004/EC for
economically active citizens and reimbursement of unemployment benefits, as well as other
possible Member State suggestions on indexation of family benefits would serve this purpose.
A deal with the UK might be much smoother if the internal EU debate around these crucial
issues could be closed prior to the decisive part of the Brexit negotiations, resulting in provisions
in EU secondary legislation that would meet the UK’s concerns. The real question now seems
rather whether other benefits (income replacement, income support, social housing, subsistence
allowances for workers) will be brought into the negotiations.
Finally, Ian Lindsay, the British ambassador in Hungary, declared that the UK wants its ‘own
British model’ and also that the UK is a big trading nation.95 Clearly the UK’s moves aim to
control EU immigration while maximising opportunities for trade. And there has been a Brexit
campaign, and a focal point of that campaign was to limit the free movement of workers.
Probably no UK government wants to come back from negotiations with European partners
without some limits on migration. On the other hand, it is clear that Germany and France seem
determined to put preserving the unity of the remaining EU member states ahead of their future
relationship with the UK. Based on the great political weight of this topic, it is feared that free
movement issues will be used as ‘bargaining chips’ in the EU exit talks,96 and extensive
negotiations will take place. It seems very unlikely that the UK will be able to disentangle itself
from the essential elements of free movement; what seems likely is that it will accept eventually
a set of reciprocal provisions that will highly mirror the EU free movement regime with the
restrictions set forth in the ‘New Settlement’.
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tourism.html. Britain and Germany demand EU cracks down on ‘benefits tourism’. 24 April 2013.
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